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I. INTRODUCTION

Of the various movements that have surfaced in American legal theory
in recent decades, law and economics has emerged as perhaps the most
influential, leading some to characterize it as the dominant contemporary
mode of analysis among American legal scholars.' This Essay considers
law and economics in the context of a comparative discussion of another
prominent intellectual legal movement, the Brisker method of Talmudic
analysis, which originated in Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth
century and quickly developed into a leading method of theoretical study
of Jewish law.
The Brisker method 2 takes its name from the Eastern European city of
Brisk,3 home to the movement's founder in the late nineteenth century,
Rabbi Chaim Soloveitchik. In his innovative lectures and posthumously
published writings, 4 "Reb Chaim" developed a highly original model
that quickly emerged as the predominant form of theoretical study of
Jewish law. The method's primary features include an emphasis on precise
definition and categorization of legal concepts, often through the framework
1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW xix (2003)
(declaring that law and economics is the "foremost interdisciplinary field of legal
studies"). See also Anthony T. Kronman, The Second Driker Forum for Excellence in
the Law, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 115, 160 (1995) (referring to law and economics as "an
enormous enlivening force in American legal thought" that "continues and remains the
single most influential jurisprudential school in the country"). The degree and nature of
success achieved by law and economics compare favorably with those achieved by other
intellectual movements, such as critical legal studies, see infra notes 93-99 and accompanying
text, law and literature. See Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835,
1836 & n.6 (2005) (observing that "[a]lthough law and literature is a contemporary of
law and economics, and arguably a response to it, scholarship in law and literature lags
far behind that in law and economics" and that "'law and economics' has been cited six
to eight times as often as 'law and literature' in recent law review articles").
2. The term "Brisker method" is a translation of "der Brisker derech. " An
alternate phrase, "der Litvishe derech," references more broadly the Lithuanian origins
of the method. See Chaim Leib Balgley, Remembering Reb Chaim Brisker, in THE
TORAH PERSONALITY 31 (Nisson Wolpin ed., 1980).
3. "Brisk" is an English version of "Bresc," the name commonly used by the
Jewish community to refer to the city of Brest-Litovsk. See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA
1359-63 (1971).
4. Reb Chaim lived from 1853 to 1918. Many of his novellae on Talmudic
tractates have been published, like his novellae on Maimonides Mishneh Torah in 1936.
See 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 130 (1971).
5. It should be noted that although Reb Chaim's method may accurately be
deemed the dominant contemporary mode of Talmudic analysis, its primacy has largely
been limited to Talmudic academies tracing their origins to Lithuanian Jewish communities.
In other academies, including those associated with Sephardic and Chassidic communities,
alternative methods of analysis continue to prevail. See 1 RABBI AHARON LICHTENSTEIN,
LEAVES OF FAITH: THE WORLD OF JEWISH LEARNING 40-41 (2003). Moreover, while
clearly influenced by Reb Chaim's method, other scholars have taken the conceptual
approach in different directions. See id at 41, 55. Cf NORMAN SOLOMON, THE ANALYTIC
MOVEMENT: HAYYIM SOLOVEITCHIK AND HIS CIRCLE 47-82 (1993).
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of underlying dichotomies. As a result, some contenporary scholars8

6
have characterized the method as "scientific," "conceptual," and "analytic."
Although the field of law and economics does not lend itself to such
neat demarcations of a time and place of origin, or to the identification
of a single founder, for the purposes of this Essay it may be helpful and
appropriate to associate the movement with the theories of the "Chicago
school" and to focus on the approach and contributions of its leading
academic proponent, Richard Posner.9 Economics is, as defined by
Posner, "the science of rational choice in the world-our world-in
which resources are limited in relation to human wants." 10 Thus, he

explains, "[t]he task of economics .. .is to explore the implications of

assuming that [a person] is a rational maximizer of [one's] ends in life,
[one's] satisfactions .. .[one's] 'self-interest."' 1

Accordingly, economic

analysis of law provides a conceptual framework for the application of
the principles of economics in the context of legal issues.
This Essay aims to examine some of the common elements of law and
economics and the Brisker method that have contributed to their success
as intellectual movements.12 Toward that end, the Essay compares the
6.

See, e.g., Moshe Lichtenstein, "What" Hath Brisk Wrought: The Brisker Derekh

Revisited, 9 THE TORAH U-MADDA J. 1, 3-4 (2000); RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK,

HALAKHIC MAN (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983) (originally published in Hebrew as Ish
ha-Halakhah,in 1 TALPIOT 3-4 (1944)).
7. See, e.g., YITCHAK ADLER, LOMDUS: A SUBSTRUCTURAL ANALYSIS vi-iX
(1989); LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 34-35; Chaim Saiman, Legal Theology: The Turn

to Conceptualism in Nineteenth Century Jewish Law, 21 J. L. & RELIGION 39, 70-72
(2005-2006).
8. See, e.g., SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 49.
9. Posner was recognized at the 1991 inaugural meeting of the American Law
and Economics Association as one of the four founders of the law and economics
movement. See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW:
FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 193 n.1 (1997); Francesco Parisi, Palgrave on Law

and Economics: A Review Essay, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 395, 397-98 (2000). For an
overview of the Chicago school and its place in the intellectual history of law and
economics, see MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra, at 51-83.
10.

POSNER, supra note 1, at 3.

11. Id.
12. Although numerous factors contribute to the success of a movement, this study
is limited to a consideration of some of the central intellectual elements, and the
corresponding appeal, of law and economics and the Brisker method. In addition,
somewhat similar to the goals of a recent book on the intellectual history of law and
economics, this study aims primarily to "describe the central ideas that each school of
thought is attempting to convey" rather that "to critique the schools of thought or the
ideas contained therein." See MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 9, at 3-4. Moreover,
like the authors of the book, I am "well aware of the pitfalls that are to be encountered in
trying to describe the essential elements of a particular school of thought when there are

founding principles of these movements, exploring similarities in their
essential characteristics. 13 Part I presents and analyzes representative
examples of the conceptual approach underlying each of these methods.
Drawing on these and other examples of each method, Part 1I observes
that the success of the methods stems in part from their common reliance
on historical antecedents as well as their emphasis on conceptual
frameworks broadly applicable within the legal systems they analyze.
Building on these observations, Part III suggests that as a result of these
characteristics, the two methods have gained a somewhat similar place
of prominence in their respective legal systems, while at the same time
facing similar criticisms. Finally, the Essay concludes with a cautious
evaluation of similarities that exist in the present and future state of law
and economics and the Brisker method.
II. REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES OF THE METHODS
A. The Brisker Method
To facilitate an examination of the nature of the Brisker method, it
may be helpful to consider an application of the method to a particular
issue in Jewish law. Among the obligations connected with the holiday
of Passover, the Torah commands each individual to offer a Passover
sacrifice during the afternoon of the fourteenth day of the first month of

continuing.., disputes within [the] schools." See MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 9,
at 4. Nevertheless, again like the authors, I suggest that "the benefits of analyzing the schools
of thought as presented here exceed the costs" of these limitations. See MERCURO &
MEDEMA, supra note 9, at 4. Notably, a number of scholars have recently considered the
contention that aspects of economic analysis resemble religious concepts. See, e.g.,
ROBERT H. NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON TO CHICAGO AND

BEYOND (2001); Symposium, Understanding Economics Through Theology: Reflections
on Robert Nelson's Economics as Religion, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 547 (2006); Anita
Bernstein, Whatever Happenedto Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303 (2005).
13. The aims of this Essay, focusing on conceptual comparisons between law and
economics and the Brisker method of analysis in Jewish law, differ from an emerging
area of scholarship that considers and critiques the substantive claims of law and
economics through a perspective of religious traditions. A recent example of the latter
form of scholarship, the program of the Section on Jewish Law at the 2005 Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in San Francisco, was entitled
"Economic Analysis of Jewish Law" and consisted of presentations by leading and
emerging scholars of law and economics, including Dean Saul Levmore of the
University of Chicago Law School and Professors Daniel Klerman, Keith Sharfman, and
Shayna Sigman. See also AARON LEVINE, ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY AND JEWISH LAW
(1993). For considerations of law and economics in Catholic perspectives, compare, e.g.,
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES
ON LEGAL THOUGHT 208 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001), with Mark A.
Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness:A Catholic Critique of Law and Economics,
44 J. CATH. LEGAL STuD. 35 (2005).
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the year, the eve of the first night of Passover,' 4 and to eat matzo that
night, the fifteenth of the month.' 5 By definition, these obligations are
incumbent only upon those who are legally adults, having reached the
age of obligation. In practice, each individual who brought a Passover
sacrifice generally represented others as well, at times including not only
adults, who thereby fulfilled their obligation to bring the sacrifice, but
also minors, who were not obligated. All those who were
6 represented
would partake in the eating of the sacrifice later that night.'
When an individual is obligated to offer the Passover sacrifice but is
precluded from doing so as a result of any of a variety of circumstances,
the Torah requires that the individual bring the sacrifice on the
fourteenth day of the7 next month, a date thus termed "Pesachsheni," the
"second Passover."' The Talmud inquires whether a minor who reaches
the age of obligation during the month between Passover and Pesach
sheni should likewise be required to offer the Passover sacrifice on
Pesach sheni of that year.18 In his landmark codification of Jewish law,
the medieval legal authority Rambam (Maimonides) 19 adopts the
position, among competing views in the Talmud, that in such a case the
20
individual is obligated to offer the Passover sacrifice on Pesach sheni.
Nevertheless, Rambam concludes that if, when still a minor on Passover,
the individual was counted among those represented in the Passover
sacrifice brought by another, the individual is not required, upon reaching
adulthood, to bring a Passover sacrifice on Pesach sheni.2' At first
glance, Rambam's rulings appear problematic; after all, if a minor is not
obligated-and therefore, by definition, unable to fulfill any obligation-to
offer the Passover sacrifice, it would seem to follow that being
represented in a22 sacrifice should not relieve the minor of an obligation
that later arises.
Moreover, as Reb Chaim notes, Rambam's ruling seems to contradict
the Talmud's discussion regarding an individual who lacks the requisite
14.
15.

See, e.g., Exodus 12:6.
See, e.g., Exodus 12:18. In Jewish law, the calendar date begins at night.
See RAMBAM [MAIMONIDES], MISHNE TORAH [CODE OF LAW], Laws of the

16.
Passover Sacrifice2:1-3.
17. See Numbers 9:9-14.

19).

18.

See BABYLONIAN TALMUD 193.

19.
20.
21.
22.

"Rambam" is the acronym for Rabbi Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides).
See RAMBAM, supra note 16, at 5:7.
See id
See RABBI JOSEPH KARO, KESEF MISHNA (commenting on RAMBAM, supra note

mental capacity and therefore is exempt from positive commandments.23
According to the Talmud, such an individual who performs the physical
actions required of a commandment does not fulfill the commandment.
For example, if the individual eats matzo on the first night of Passover,
this action does not qualify to fulfill the commandment to eat matzo.
Therefore, according to the Talmud, if the individual then gains the
requisite mental capacity in the course of the night, thereby becoming
obligated to perform commandments, the obligation to eat matzo will
remain unfulfilled until the individual eats the matzo while possessing
the requisite mental capacity. 24 The Talmud's conclusion seems to imply
that if a minor is counted among those represented in the Passover
sacrifice brought by another, even though adults who are similarly included
in the same sacrifice thereby fulfill their obligation, the minor, who is
not yet obligated, should not qualify as having fulfilled any obligation.
Accordingly, if such an individual reaches the age of obligation prior to
Pesach sheni, the individual should be obligated to bring a Passover
sacrifice on Pesach sheni.
A number of scholars have attempted to resolve the apparent problems
posed by Rambam's rulings. For example, Rabbi Joseph Karo, a leading
sixteenth century legal authority, cites the suggestion that the inclusion
of a minor in the Passover sacrifice stands as an exception to the general
rule regarding the actions of a minor in relation to commandments.
Specifically, because a minor is authorized to be counted among those
represented in a Passover sacrifice for the purpose of being permitted to
eat of the sacrifice, the minor is likewise relieved of any further
obligation with respect to bringing the Passover sacrifice.2 5
Reb Chaim offers an alternative resolution to the problems presented
by Rambam's conclusions. 26 Unlike Rabbi Karo's approach, which is
premised upon a technical legal rule unique to the Passover sacrifice,
Reb Chaim's resolution operates within a broader analytical framework,
applicable to a wide range of issues in Jewish law. Reb Chaim distinguishes
between the essential nature of the commandment to offer the Passover
sacrifice and that of the commandment to eat matzo. He explains that
the essence of the commandment to eat matzo operates in relation to the
gavra, the person, who is obligated to perform the act of eating the

23. See SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 6, at 67 (quoting TALMUD BAVLI, Rosh haShana 28a).
24. See id. See also RAMBAM, supra note 16, Laws of Chametz and Matzo 6:3.
25. See KARO, supra note 22.
26. See SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 6, at 67-68.
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matzo.27 Therefore, an individual who is not obligated, but performs, the
physical act of eating matzo on the first night of Passover has not
fulfilled the commandment; thus, if in the course of the night, the
individual then becomes obligated to eat matzo, the
28 act of eating the
matzo must be repeated to fulfill the commandment.
In contrast, Reb Chaim posits that the essence of the commandment to
offer the Passover sacrifice operates in relation to the chefiza, the
"object" through which the commandment is performed-specifically,
the animal that is brought as a sacrifice. 2 9 Although the obligation is, of
course, directed at the person commanded to offer the sacrifice,
conceptually, the mechanics of the commandment operate primarily
through the requirement that the sacrifice be brought. Consequently,
once the sacrifice is properly offered, the individual who has brought the
sacrifice and those on whose behalf it has been brought have all satisfied
the commandment. 30 Moreover, Reb Chaim notes that although a minor
is not obligated to offer sacrifices, a minor is nevertheless not excluded
generally from the laws that apply to sacrifices. 31 Likewise, he suggests,
the rule that a properly offered Passover sacrifice serves to satisfy the
obligations of all those on whose behalf it is brought applies to the minor
as well. Thus, as a result of being included in a properly offered Passover
sacrifice while still a minor, an individual is relieved of any applicable
obligation in connection with the commandment. Therefore, as Rambam
concludes, if the individual then reaches the age of obligation prior to
Pesach sheni, there32 is no requirement to repeat the act of bringing the
Passover sacrifice.
The application of the chefiza/gavra dichotomy to explain and distinguish
between the essential qualities of the commandments of the Passover
27. Although Reb Chaim does not expressly use the term "gavra" in this
discussion, in the context of his methodology, it is universally the conceptual counterpart
to the term "chefiza".
28. See SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 6, at 67-68.
29. See id.
30. The distinction in characterization between commandments operating in
relation to the gavra and those operating in relation to the cheftza may bear more than a
passing conceptual resemblance to the distinction between in personam jurisdiction and
in rem jurisdiction. In either case, the individual is subject to the jurisdiction of the
court; however, the mechanics yielding the court's exercise of jurisdiction may operate
directly in relation to the individual or, alternatively, primarily in relation to the
individual's property and, as a consequence, in relation to the individual. See SOLOMON,
supra note 5, at 123.
31.
See SOLOVEITCHIK,supra note 6, at 67-68.
32.
See id

sacrifice and eating matzo, respectively, illustrates some of the elements
of the Brisker method that have led to its characterization as
"conceptual" or "analytic. 33 Rather than focusing upon the technical
aspects of each particular legal rule and restricting the examination to
only the most directly relevant Talmudic passages, the Brisker method
constructs conceptual frameworks through which a broad range of legal
principles can be analyzed and understood, in a generally applicable and
systematic manner. 34 Thus, Reb Chaim's resolution of the specific issue
of Rambam's treatment of the commandments of the Passover sacrifice
and eating matzo is not limited to an explanation of unusual or unique
aspects of one or both of these areas of law. Instead, Reb Chaim's
approach is premised upon a conceptual dichotomy that similarly serves
as a means of explaining the nature of a number of other commandments
through their categorization as essentially based in the chefiza or the
gavra aspect of the commandment.35
B. Law andEconomics
The methodology employed in law and economics has been described
and applied in painstaking detail, producing a vast and growing body of
legal scholarship widely accessible to American legal scholars.36 Thus,
a brief example may suffice for the purposes of illustrating the application
of the method to conceptualize an issue in the American legal system.
In his groundbreaking text on the economic analysis of law, Posner
engages in an extensive discussion of one of the basic components of the
common law, the area of tort law. Posner first addresses the topic of
accidents, or unintentional torts, citing Judge Learned Hand's formula
for the determination of negligence. Under the Hand Formula, a defendant
is negligent if and only if B<PL, where B represents the "cost of
precaution" to prevent the accident, P represents the probability of the
accident's occurrence, and L represents the magnitude of the potential
loss. 37 Through this formula, Posner notes, the potential injurer will be
required to act to prevent the accident only to the extent that such
33. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
34. See discussion infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
35. See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 123-26; SHLOMO YOSEF ZEVIN, ISHIM V'SHITOT
49-57 (3d ed. 1966). For additional discussions of the Brisker approach to the chefiza/gavra
dichotomy in the context of the Passover sacrifice, see HERSHEL SCHACHTER, MIPNINE1
HARAv 96 (2001); SHLOMO YOSEF ZEVIN, HAMOADIM B'HALACHA 225-26 (1955).

36. See POSNER, supra note 1, at xx and n.3 (citing Bryant G. Garth, Strategic
Research in Law andSociety, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 57, 59 (1990); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A QuantitativeStudy, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 385 (1993)).
37. See id.at 168 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947)).
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prevention will result in a net social gain.3 8 Thus, according to Posner,
the Hand Formula reflects the incorporation of the economic principle of
efficiency to define the contours of the law of negligence. Through
further and more complex application of the Hand Formula, Posner offers
an economic analysis of a wide range of issues related to negligence.39
Turning to the topic of intentional torts, Posner suggests that, analytically,
the distinction between intentional and unintentional torts may prove
both vague and, at times, inaccurate.40 Posner recounts an early nineteenth
century English case 41 in which a defendant kept a valuable tulip
garden about a mile from his house. After finding that a wall around the
garden had failed to prevent tulips from being stolen, the defendant set
up a spring gun to protect the garden. One day, a neighbor's peahen
escaped and entered the garden, followed by the pursuing plaintiff, who
tripped the spring gun and was injured. The courts held that because the
defendant failed to post warnings of the spring gun, and because the
injury occurred in the daytime, the defendant was liable for the injury.42
Posner considers the case through the lens of economic analysis,
framing the issue as "the proper accommodation of two legitimate
activities," the defendant's growing tulips and the plaintiff's keeping
animals. 43 Under the circumstances, Posner notes, the spring gun may
have served as the most cost-effective means for the defendant to protect
the tulips. 44 At the same time, however, because spring guns deter not
only thieves but innocent trespassers as well, such as owners who are
attempting to recover straying animals, they will cause an increase in the
cost involved in keeping animals; as a result of the presence of the
spring gun, animal owners will either face greater expenses, necessary to
prevent animals from straying, or incur greater losses, through the
decreased ability to follow and recover animals straying onto the
defendant's property.45
In Posner's analysis, the court's decision "implied an ingenious
accommodation. ' ' 6 Specifically, if owners who set up spring guns are
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id.
See id at 167-204.
See id at 204.
Bird v. Holbrook, (1828) 4 Bing 628, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (C.P.).
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 204-05.
See id. at 205.
See id.
Id.

46.

See id

required to post notices, the absence of such notices signals to animal
owners the absence of spring guns; as a result, if there are no signs posted,
animal owners will not be deterred from following and recovering their
straying animals.4 7 To the extent that such notices will not be effective
at night, it is less likely that an animal will be left unsecured at night
and, if the animal strays, much less likely that its owner will follow after
it.48 On the basis of this analysis, Posner concludes that, although the
defendant intentionally set up the spring gun, the case is more accurately
understood through principles applicable to negligence cases.49
Accordingly, Posner presents an alternative analytical framework,
distinguishing torts involving "a conflict between legitimate (productive)
activities" from those such as fraud, involving "a coerced transfer of
wealth to the defendant in a setting of low transaction costs." 5° The
latter category represents conduct that "is inefficient because it violates
the principle that when market transaction costs are low, people should
be required to use the market if they can and to desist from the conduct
if they can't." 51
Posner's application of an economic framework for the analysis of the
court's decision in an early nineteenth century English case illustrates
some of the significant characteristics of law and economics. Although
the court's decision appeared to rest on a notion of fairness, faulting the
owner of the tulips for failing to post signs warning of the spring gun,
the implications of its ruling seemed limited to the relatively particular
and somewhat unusual facts of the case, superficially involving an
apparently intentional tort committed against a trespasser. In contrast,
Posner seeks to uncover the underlying logic supporting the court's
ruling, placing it within the broader conceptual framework of law and
economics. Reconceptualized as posing an economic problem of
balancing competing claims to legitimate activities, the case presents the
court with the opportunity to resolve the dispute, "ingenious[ly]" according
to Posner,52 on the basis of a methodology generally applied to negligence
cases. Thus, in Posner's economic framework, the case takes on a wider
significance, somewhat removed from its specific facts. Understood in
this light, the case serves to demonstrate the broad applicability and
consistency of economic analysis, while at the same time the underlying
conceptual characteristics of the case are revealed as more similar to
negligence than to intentional torts.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 205.
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III.

SIMILAR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE METHODS: BUILDING ON
INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS TO DEVELOP A THEORY

OF BROAD APPLICABILITY AND APPEAL

A. The Brisker Method
To be sure, notwithstanding the originality of his approach, Reb
Chaim was far from the first to utilize conceptual frameworks as a
method for understanding the Jewish legal system. For example, the
cheftza/gavra dichotomy finds an antecedent in the ancient Talmudic
discussion of the commandment to place fringes on the comers of a fourcornered garment. 53 In Talmudic terminology, certain aspects of the
commandment depend upon its characterization as essentially operating
either through the obligation incumbent upon the gavra, the individual,
to perform the commandment, or alternatively, through the manne, the
object upon which the commandment54 is performed-here, the garment,
which must have fringes placed on it.
Likewise, the Talmud utilizes a similar dichotomy to explain the
conceptual distinction between two different types of oaths, a neder and
a shevua. Through a neder, the chefiza-the object identified in the
oath-becomes prohibited to an individual, while through a shevua, the
55
individual undertakes an obligation or prohibition vis-A-vis an object.
Indeed, from the text of the Talmud through the works of medieval
and modem commentators, conceptualization, dichotomization, and
categorization have played an important role in the analysis of Jewish
56
law.
Notwithstanding the historical antecedents to Reb Chaim's approach,
however, the Brisker method stands out in the extent to which it offers a
systematic and broadly applicable framework for the conceptual analysis
of Jewish law.57 Indeed, Reb Chaim's work, recorded both in his carefully
53.

See Numbers 15:38.

54. See TALMUD BAVLI, Menachoth 41 a, 42b.
55. See TALMUD BAVLI, Nedarim 2b. See also JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, YEMEI
ZICHARON 21-23 (1996).
56. See SOLOMON, supra note 5, at 123-26.
57. See LICHTENSTErN, supra note 5, at 40. Explains:

The conceptual approach is no recent innovation. Its primary features are clearly
present in [the Talmud], recurrently manifest in [Medieval legal sources], and
amply exemplified by many [modem legal commentators] who were
precursors to the Brisker tradition, with which the approach is now most
familiarly associated. Much of this is only perceived in retrospect, however,
and unquestionably Reb [Chaim], for whom this approach was not merely one

written essays, structured according to corresponding sections of Rambam's
Code of Law, 58 and in his lectures, transcribed by his students and
organized according to the order of the Talmud, 59 encompasses topics
representative of nearly the entire range of Jewish law, including, among
others: martyrdom, prayer, ritual objects, the Sabbath and various
holidays, marriage and divorce, dietary laws, agricultural laws, the
Temple and sacrifices, ritual purity, contracts, torts, property, criminal
law, commercial law, procedure, and estate law, in addition to several
subtopics and other related areas.
Moreover, a number of areas of law that proved most prominent in
Reb Chaim's methodology had previously seemed least susceptible to
conceptual analysis, appearing instead to revolve largely around
technical and particularistic details. One of Reb Chaim's most influential
intellectual heirs, Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik-who was also his
grandson-wrote eloquently of the striking innovation effected by the
application of Reb Chaim's method to the analysis of dietary laws,
manifested in "matters of abstract thought and orderly concepts, which
combine [to produce] a unified, consistent theory." 60 As a result, "[t]he
spoons and pots, the onions and radishes, have disappeared from the
[laws] of meat and milk; boiling water that has fallen into wine, a mouse
that has fallen into oil-all have disappeared from the [laws] of
mixtures; blood and fat, salt and spit have disappeared from the laws of
salting. ' 61 In short, these matters "have been moved from the kitchen and
into another sphere ... which is entirely concerned with conceptual
structures." 62 The effectiveness of Reb Chaim's method, in providing a
of the many arrows in his quiver, but the central mode of learning, gave
conceptualism great impetus toward preeminence. In this respect he certainly
effected a major sea change-particularly noteworthy when his achievement is
contrasted with the overall direction of most of his immediate forerunners and
contemporaries.... In this undertaking, he surely had ample precedent and
built upon predecessors. Just as surely, he was strikingly original.
See also Lichtenstein, supra note 6, at 16 n.9. Discussing
Though [Medieval commentators] ... occasionally offer conceptual analysis
similar to the Brisker method, they do it not systematically but intuitively.
The change brought about by [Reb Chaim], which justifies the claim that he
created a new method, is precisely the fact that conceptualizations and analysis
of the phenomenon were transformed into a system ....[T]he significance of
Brisk is not in the fact that an approach never before attempted was introduced
into the world of learning, but that a system has been created.
58. See SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 6,passim.
59. RABBI CHAIM SOLOVEITCHIK, CHIDUSHE HA-GRACH AL HA-SHAS. See also
RABBI CHAIM SOLOVEITCHIK, SHIuREI RABBENU CHAIM HA-LEVI, published in 1998 from

Reb Chaim's notes.
60. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 44 (quoting and translating RABBI JOSEPH B.
SOLOVEITCHIK, DrvREi HAGUT vE-HA'ARACHA 80 (1981)).
61. Id. at 44-45 (quoting and translating SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 59, at 80).
62. Id. at 45 (quoting and translating SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 59, at 80).
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conceptual framework for the systematic analysis of such a wide array of
legal materials, evokes similarities to "scientific" methods that present
organizing principles to explain various empirical and observational data.63
The scientific and conceptual characteristics of the Brisker method
may account in part for the rapid and widespread prominence it gained
in academies of Jewish law. In the words of a leading current proponent
of Reb Chaim's method, "for sheer beauty and excitement, tedious plodding
through... laborious, relatively mechanical, and often technical" legal
material "cannot hold a candle to Reb [Chaim's] soaring imagination and
piercing insights. 64 Others have suggested that, in addition, the scientific
approach had particular appeal in the context of the modem intellectual
milieu of late nineteenth century Europe.65
Moreover, the systematic quality of the Reb Chaim's approach offered
a powerful alternative to one of the methods of Talmudic theory to
which it responded, the pilpul mode of analysis. Taking its name from
the Hebrew word for "pepper," a paradigm of sharp food, pilpul placed
an emphasis on applying sharply calculated arguments to investigate the
complexity of Talmudic logic. Although on one level, pilpul follows-and
extends-a traditional method of rigorous reasoning prominent in Jewish

63.

See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.

64. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 43, 50-52; (describing both: a "subjective
element" to the attractive nature of the Brisker method, expressed in "the excitement and
the sparkle of conceptual analysis" and "the precision and sweep manifested in the best
of Brisk [that] simply does not characterize grappling and groping within the confines of
a pragmatic mode"; and an "objective factor" premised on the view that "Torah that
is perceived as grounded upon rational principles and marked by consistency and
coherence, that is developed and perceived as an organic unity, is nobler than one that is
a potpourri of practical directives" and that "[t]here is power, majesty, and grandeur in
Torah, conceptually formulated, that a patchwork of minutiae, largely molded by ad hoc
pragmatic considerations, simply cannot match").
65.
Lawrence Kaplan, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik's Philosophy of Halakha, 7
JEWISH LAW ANNUAL 139, 190 (1988) (according to Lawrence Kaplan, although there is
a "good deal of truth" to the suggestion that the emphasis on a scientific model of legal
analysis may have been in part an apologetic response to modernity,
[t]here is a deeper reason behind the general appeal of the scientific model...
and ... this deeper reason is the essential reason. For the system of science
provides [Jewish law] with a model of a system that has a strictly objective and
autonomous character but at the same time allows for, indeed is the result of,
profound and powerful human creativity. And the traditional [theorist of
Jewish law] seeks to maintain the strict objectivity and autonomy of [Jewish
law] ...but together with that, sees [Jewish law] as an unfolding conceptual
system that allows for, nay demands, ongoing human creativity.).

law at least since the times of the Talmud,66 the movement began to
encounter critics who characterized it, in the words of one historian, as
"the twisting of plain truth resulting out of the hairsplitting efforts of the
most sharp-witted. ' '67 In contrast to pilpul's clever-if, at times, somewhat
convoluted-deconstruction of Talmudic passages and modes of
argumentation, Reb Chaim's approach provided a methodology for a
more structured understanding of Jewish law as a system of orderly
logic, comprising clearly articulated, albeit complex and rigorously
applied, conceptual frameworks.
B. Law andEconomics
Likewise, despite the significance of law and economics as a late
twentieth century movement, and of the importance of Posner and the
Chicago school as leading proponents, Posner readily acknowledges
earlier expressions of the economic analysis of law. Indeed, the Hand
Formula, which serves as a basis for the economic analysis of negligence,
was articulated in a 1947 case.6 8 Moreover, although Posner characterizes
the Hand Formula as "relatively new," he finds antecedents in earlier
cases, suggesting, in fact, that "the method it capsualizes has been used
to determine negligence ever since69 negligence was first adopted as the
standard to govern accident cases.,
Thus, Posner characterizes an 1856 English case, 70 emphasizing that
an injury was "of unprecedented severity," as finding that "the probability
of the loss had been low," thereby leading to the court's conclusion that,
in Posner's terms, "[t]he damage was not so great as to make the expected
cost of the accident greater than the cost of prevention.", 71 Similarly, in
Posner's reading of a 1919 New York Court of Appeals case,72 Cardozo's
opinion employs "terms suggestive of economic insight, 73 including the
declaration that "[c]hance of harm"-low P-"though remote, may
66. See
26 (1939).
67.

RABBI MOsHE AVIGDOR AMIEL, 1 HA-MIDDOT L'CHEKER HA-HALACHA 1-

Mordechai Breuer, Pilpul, in 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 524, 524-27. See also

LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 42 (describing "dexterous pyrotechnics" and "ingeniously
convoluted" reasoning); id.at 50 (describing "far-fetched and fantastic" and "diversionary
and trivial" reasoning). See generally Mordechai Breuer, Aliyat ha-Pilpul V'ha-chilukim
B 'Yeshivot Ashkenaz, in SEFER HA-ZICHARON L'MORENU YECHIEL YAAKOV WEINBERG
241-255 (1969) (describing the initial success of and subsequent opposition to the
evolving pilpul method.).
68. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
69. POSNER, supra note 1, at 169.
70.

1047.
71.

Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works, (1856) 11 Exch. Div. 781, 156 Eng. Rep.

POSNER, supra note 1, at 169.

72.

Adams v. Bullock, 227 N.Y. 208, 125 N.E. 93 (1919) (Cardozo, J.).

73.

POSNER, supra note 1, at 170.
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betoken negligence, if needless"-very low B.74 In addition, Posner
further acknowledges that even before 1960, which he marks as the start
of the "new" law and economics,75 there were a number of important
"precursors" to contemporary economic analysis of law, applied to fields
such as antitrust and "other regulation of explicit economic markets, 76
as well as criminal law and tort law, among other areas. 7
In a manner similar to the Brisker method, relying on previous
applications of economic analysis to a variety of legal issues, Posner and
other scholars have aimed to produce a systematic framework for the
economic analysis of nearly every area of American law.78 As Posner
describes it, "the hallmark of the 'new' law and economics-the law and
economics that has emerged since 1960-is the application of
economics of the legal system across the board. ' ' 79 Specifically, Posner
enumerates the application of economics:
to common law fields such as torts, contracts, restitution, and property; to the
theory and practice of punishment; to civil, criminal, and administrative
procedure; to the theory of legislation and regulation; to law enforcement and
judicial administration; and even to80constitutional law, primitive law, admiralty
law, family law, and jurisprudence.

Just as a survey of Reb Chaim's work illustrates the wide-ranging
applicability of the Brisker method throughout the Jewish legal system,
the table of contents of Posner's text bespeaks the ambitious goal of
demonstrating the effectiveness of law and economics as a viable theory
8
for understanding almost any issue within the American legal system. 1
74. Id. at 170 (quoting Adams, 227 N.Y. at 208, and drawing parallels to P and B).
75. Id. at 23 (citing Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionsand the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960)).
76. See id. at 23 (referencing the work of Henry Simons in tax law, Henry Manne
in corporate law, Arnold Plant in patent law, Robert Hale in contract law, and Ronald
Coase and others in public utility and common carrier regulation).
77. See id. at 23-24 n.2 (referencing the works of Beccaria and Bentham in
criminal law, and citing a number of articles identifying precursors to law and economics
in other areas).
78. See POSNER, supra note 1, at xix (declaring that the breadth of the book's
coverage includes "almost the whole legal system") (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 23.
80. Id.
81. See id. at ix-xviii. Indeed, even the more abbreviated "Summary of Contents"
delineates applications to: "the common law," including "property, contract rights and
remedies, family law and sex law, tort law, criminal law, the common law, legal history
and jurisprudence"; "public regulation of the market," including "the theory of monopoly,
the antitrust laws, the regulation of the employment relation, public utility and common

Moreover, parallel to Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik's observation regarding
the Brisker method, Posner notes the degree to which economic
analysis has been utilized to understand areas of nonmarket behavior that
might seem least related to economics. Indeed, the structure and substance
of Posner's text aims, in part, to focus on these areas of the law, highlighting
the broad range of applicability of law and economics. Thus, according
to Posner, one of the significant features of his book is the "emphasis
placed upon the legal regulation of nonmarket behavior-not only
familiar examples such as crimes and accidents and lawsuits, but also
less familiar (to economists) examples such as drug addiction, thefts of
art, sexual acts, surrogate motherhood, rescues at sea, flag desecration,
public international law, presidential pardons, democratic theory, and
religious observances. ' 3 Therefore, as Posner poignantly explains in the
preface to his text, "[t]his approach enables the law to be seen, grasped,
and studied as a system-a system that economic
analysis can illuminate,
84
reveal as coherent and in places improve.
Again echoing the Brisker method, 85 the scientific and systematic
characteristics of law and economics may thus have contributed substantially
to its striking and somewhat singular success as an intellectual movement in
contemporary American legal theory. Posner cites with approval the
observation that "[l]aw and economics represents the one example of a
social science that has successfully found a place at the core of the legal
arguments made in courts, administrative agencies, and other legal
settings. ,,86 Moreover, the science of economics may have particular
simplicity, and
appeal because of what Posner describes as "the unity,
power, but also the subtlety, of economic principles. '87
carrier regulation, the choice between regulation and common law"; "the law of business

organizations and financial markets," including "corporations, secured and unsecured

financing, bankruptcy, financial markets"; "law and the distribution of income and wealth,"
including "income inequalities, distributive justice, and poverty, taxation, the transmission of
wealth at death"; "the legal process," including "the market, the adversary system, and
the legislative process as methods of resource allocation, the process of legal rulemaking,
civil and criminal procedure, evidence, law enforcement and the administrative process";
and "the Constitution and the federal system," including "the nature and functions of the
Constitution, economic due process, the economics of federalism, racial discrimination,
the protection of free markets in ideas and religion, searches, seizures, and interrogations." Id.
at vii-viii.
82. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
83. Id.at xix.
84. Id.
85. See supra notes 63 and accompanying text.
86. POSNER, supra note 1, at xx n.3 (quoting Bryant G.Garth, Strategic Research
in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 57, 59 (1990)). Cf Morton J. Horwitz, Law
and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980) (arguing that
"[t]he economic analysis of law, I believe, could maintain its prestige only so long as it
wrapped itself in the cloak of science").
87. POSNER, supra note 1, at xix.
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Accordingly, in yet another parallel to the emergence of the Brisker
method,8 8 the prominence of law and economics may be attributed in

part to its ability to provide a systematic alternative to other intellectual
89

movements.
In a stinging 1974 review of the first edition of Posner's
book, Arthur Leff noted the appeal of law and economics as a response
to the Realists.9" According to Leff, one of the central features of legal
realism was its view of the law in terms of "existential reality" rather

than "systematic consistency," a view that was not only "liberating" but
also "ultimately terrifying" in the context of "a universe normatively
empty and empirically overflowing." 9 1 Leff thus posited that "the move
to economic analysis in law schools seems an attempt to get over, to at
least get by, the complexity thrust upon us by the Realists. '92 Thirty
years later, Leffts begrudging description of law and economics as an
effective response to legal realism continues to ring true.93
Indeed, the pattern detected by Leff and others seems to have been
repeated more recently with the evolution of legal realism into critical
legal studies. Though notoriously difficult to define, 94 by most accounts

88. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
89. Although of course, the relative success of these and other movements is
intertwined with political, philosophical, and other forces, the focus of this study remains
the intellectual elements and appeal of the movements. See discussion supra note 11.
90. Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism,
60 VA. L. REV. 451, 459 (1974).
91. Id. at454, 455.
92. Id.at 459.
93. See also Horwitz, supra note 86, at 905 ("Law-and-economics emerges to fill
the intellectual vacuum left by Legal Realism"); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 125 (1987) (describing law and economics as "an attempt to respond to
an ongoing internal legal academic crisis, the difficulty of justifying the separation of
law and politics that has beset post-Realist legal academics who have been taught that
legal rules are nothing but policy-oriented decisions"); MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note
9, at 12-13 (stating that "it was the Legal Realists who created an environment that was
more receptive to the introduction of economics into the law school curriculum" and
referring to law and economics as "an attempt.., to fill the void left by Legal Realism").
Cf Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 918 (1997) (observing
that "[t]he breakdown of Langdell's vision of law as science throughout the twentieth
century has occasioned many attempts to find or reconstruct the intelligent knowledge of
the law" and characterizing Posner's efforts as an example of "the manifestations of a
professional desire to reinstitute the discipline of law as a science").
94. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A PoliticalHistory, 100 YALE
L.J. 1515, 1516 (1991) (stating that "as I read articles by and about critical legal studies,
I not infrequently find myself puzzled" when authors "describe what they believe critical
legal studies to be, and yet the descriptions do not resonate strongly with what I think
about the law" and that "I find these authors taking as central to their understanding of

critical legal studies is broadly premised, in part, on uncovering the
inherent contradictions in liberal legal thought. 95 The focus in critical
legal studies on demonstrating the indeterminacy of the law through the
deconstruction of the forms of legal reasoning, reminiscent of the pilpul
method of Talmudic analysis, 96 led to the arguably fatal critique of
critical legal studies as overly nihilistic in its view of the law. 97 As one
proponent of critical legal studies sarcastically put it, in light of this
perceived nihilism, the failure of the movement to answer the subsequent
question "[what would you put in its place" effectively "killed" critical
legal studies. Notwithstanding the merits of the argument that this is
the "wrong question" and therefore could not have "killed" critical legal
studies, 99 the perception of failure remains, stemming from an inability
to offer a systematic account of the law. Accordingly, upon the
perceived death of the nihilistic critical legal studies movement, law and
economics was able to claim victory through its contrasting reliance on a
structured and systematic approach to the legal system. 100

[critical legal studies] propositions that I find extremely problematic, or dismissing as
unimportant propositions that I find central.").
95. See generally KELMAN, supra note 93.
96. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227
(1984). See also Richard Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed Critical Legal
Studies, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 779, 781-82 (1992) (quoting and citing sources).
98. See Fischl, supra note 97, at 780.
99. See id.See also Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 801, 802 (1991) ("What should be done? How should we live? What should
the law be? These are the momentous questions. These are the hard questions."); Pierre
Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN L. REV. 167, 177 (1990).
100. See Daria Roithmayr, A Dangerous Supplement, 55 J. LEGAL EDuC. 80, 84
(2005) (stating that "[t]he 'science' of economics promises to make legal reasoning even
more objective than it ostensibly was" and that "[u]nder law and economics, the scientific
domain of legal reasoning has been recaptured as the domain of objective economic
reasoning... while the domain of politics has now been separated out as the subjective").
Notably, however, despite the apparent competition between critical legal studies and
law and economics, the two movements share a number of insights and emphases. See, e.g.,
KELMAN, supra note 93, at 114-85; MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 9, at 157-70. Indeed,
despite any claim to victory over critical legal studies on the part of law and economics,
and despite the clear substantive differences in the movements, the economic analysis of
law has arguably borrowed and benefited from methodologies developed in part by critical
legal studies, such as an emphasis on interdisciplinary and empirical research.
Similarly, to some degree, the conceptual frameworks that Reb Chaim introduced
resemble the rigorous distinctions that form the basis of the pilpul method. Indeed, it
need not prove surprising to find similarities among distinct intellectual movements
analyzing the same substantive material. Nevertheless, a close look at the apparent
similarities among pilpul and Reb Chaim's approach serves to highlight the significant
differences between the two methods. See SOLOMON, supra note 8, at 117-20.
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IV.

SIMILARITIES IN CRITICISM OF THE METHODS AND RESPONSES

A. The Brisker Method
Not surprisingly, in addition to-and likely, at least in part as a result
of-its rapid and considerable success in attracting adherents, Reb Chaim's
method attracted criticism as well. An examination of some of the
criticisms, together with responses that have been offered, may serve to
illuminate further the nature of Reb Chaim's method. Indeed, to some
extent, the criticisms themselves prove less a challenge to the method
than an occasion for elucidation and articulation of its salient features.
Much of the criticism, some of which surfaced during Reb Chaim's
lifetime, was broadly premised on the contention that Reb Chaim's
theories seemed inconsistent with the approaches and concerns traditionally
applied in the study of Jewish law. On a basic level, there was apparently
some resistance to the degree of innovation inherent in Reb Chaim's
creative methodology. 10' More substantively, critics claimed that Reb
Chaim's conceptualizations of the law were at times insufficiently or
02
inconclusively based in the legal sources analyzed and explicated.1
Relatedly, it has been argued that Reb Chaim's focus on conceptualization
relies upon broadly structured theories that entail insufficient attention to
concrete analysis of the law and detailed disquisition of the Talmudic
text.'o 3
101. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 41-42 (quoting and translating REB
HENOCH AGUS, SEFER MARCHESHET (1931)) (describing "the well-known [development]
that, in our time the ways of study in the learning of our sacred Torah have changed

considerably" and contrasting "these which are newly come from near, bringing with
them the style of their learning" with his own experience, in which "all my life, I grew
up among scholars of the old [school]" and "the well-maintained, well-trodden paths of
our teachers, early and later"). Others were harsher in their criticisms, referring to the
Brisker method as "chemistry" and decrying the notion of new "methods" of study. See
Marc B. Shapiro, The Brisker Method Reconsidered: Review Essay, 31 TRADITION 78,
79-80 (1997) (reviewing SOLOMON, supra note 8).
102. See Lawrence Kaplan, The Hazon Ish: Haredi Critic of TraditionalOrthodoxy,
in THE USES OF TRADITION 145, 154-55 (Jack Wertheimer ed., 1992) (observing that, in
the important glosses of the Hazon Ish on Reb Chaim's writings, "[a]bove all, he
consistently and firmly opposes what he views as attempts on the part of Reb [Chaim] to
read certain concepts and ideas into the Rambam or the [Talmud] which are not stated
clearly therein"). See Kaplan at 155 n.32 (citing sources). See also LICHTENSTEIN, supra
note 5, at 78 (acknowledging that "[i]t may indeed perhaps be doubtful whether in
codifying his positions regarding [particular legal issues], [Rambam] personally sought
to communicate everything Reb [Chaim] expounded by way of explication").
103. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 45 (noting Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik's
conceptualization of the physical elements of dietary laws, but acknowledging that some

Responses to these arguments vary, but most seem to share the
common thesis that the criticisms are based upon a misunderstanding of
the underlying goals and claims of the Brisker method. In spite of the
innovative nature of the methodology he developed, Reb Chaim insisted
that his aim was not to initiate new ideas, but rather to obtain a clearly
14
defined understanding of the Jewish legal tradition that preceded him.
Accordingly, although Reb Chaim's methodology often employed conceptual
frameworks that had not been expressly articulated in earlier sources, the
subject of analysis remained the Talmudic discussions as understood
through the works of earlier commentators and legal authorities, most
prominently Rambam. 0 5 Likewise, as one scholar has put it, the notion
that the Brisker method requires less attention to detail applies only to
"details that are neither here nor there with respect to [conceptual]
principles."' 0 6 In contrast, "even technical details receive major attention"
in the Brisker method when "related10 7to conceptual issues [] through
which... the issues can be refracted."'
"deplore" this approach, because "[t]hey need to hear dishes rattling and utensils clattering in
order to feel connected with" the world, or, "impelled by a holistic perception of
metaphysical and spiritual reality, [they] view analysis with a jaundiced eye"). Cf
Lichtenstein, supra note 6, at 2 ("[T]he Brisker approach shifted the learner's interest
from the talmudic discussion itself... to the practical implications thereof... ").
104. Reb Chaim is quoted stating that "our role is not to create [new ideas], for this
was the task of the early commentators on the Talmud. Our duty is merely to understand
the words of the early commentators." Shapiro, supra note 101, at 80. Likewise,
Shapiro notes that in their introduction to Reb Chaim's work on Rambam's Code of
Law, Reb Chaim's sons emphasize that his method was "in accordance with the
approach taught to us by our teachers, the [early commentators], of blessed memory."
Id. at 81 (quoting and translating Introduction to SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 4). See also
SOLOMON, supra note 8, at 91-92.
105. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 34-35 (asserting that "it would, of course,
be naive to assume that the whole of [Reb Chaim's work on the Rambam's Code of
Law] was composed purely in order to defend [Rambam]. Unquestionably, many of the
seminal ideas had been developed independently, as part of the process of understanding
the [Talmud], and here found application."). See also LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 7879 (finding that "[t]he potential for the whole of [Reb Chaim's work on Rambam's
Code] is surely latent within the raw material of the [Code]-within its individual
components and the sum total of their interrelation-although it may have taken a genius
of Reb [Chaim's] stature to extract and elucidate its content."). Cf Shapiro, supra note
101, at 81 (stating that "the Brisker method assumes that if the [earlier commentators]
had seen the way their positions were explained and presented, they would agree" with
Reb Chaim's derivations and analytical structure).
106. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38. See also Lichtenstein, supra note 6, at 16
n.9 (observing that the Brisker method
restricts the treatment of the [Talmudic section] solely to the conceptual issue,
to the exclusion of other queries [such as] [i]ssues relating to the dialogue's ...
cogency, or to textual or practical problems, . . . insofar as they are deemed
essentially technical issues that have nothing to contribute to the essence of the
[topic].).
RABBI HERSHEL SCHACHTER, NEFESH HA-RAV 12-19 (1994).
107. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38.
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Indeed, as some have suggested, the goals and approaches of the
Brisker method may be best understood through analogy to the scientific
method. 0 8 For both the scientist and those applying the Brisker method
108. The most explicit and most sustained comparisons between the Brisker method
and the scientific method were offered by Reb Chaim's grandson, Rabbi Joseph B.
Soloveitchik. For example, Rabbi Soloveitchik describes the "approach... of mathematics
and the mathematical, natural sciences" as "construct[ing] an ideal, ordered and fixed
world ..

.

fashion[ing] an a priori, ideal creation," which is "superimpose[d] ... upon the

realm of concrete empirical reality ...... SOLOVEITCHIK supra note 6, at 18-19.
Similarly, he writes, "[t]he essence of [Jewish law], which was received from God,
consists in creating an ideal world and cognizing the relationship between the ideal
world and our concrete environment in all its visible manifestations and underlying
structures." Id. at 19-20. See also Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Mah Dodech Midod, in
JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, BESOD HAYACHID V'HAYACHAD 231 (1970) [hereinafter
Soloveitchik, Mah Dodech Midod] (referring to Reb Chaim's "mathematical thinking"
and stating that Reb Chaim "provided for [Jewish law] specific methodological tools,
created a complex of [Jewish legal] categories and an order of a priori premises through
a process of pure postulatization" (quoted and translated in Kaplan, supra note 102, at
165). For a thoughtful and extensive consideration of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik's
approach, as it appears in many of his written works, see id., passim.
According to Kaplan:
Rabbi [Joseph] Soloveitchik is not concerned with a philosophy of the Talmud
but with the philosophy of [Jewish law]. He is not interested so much in the
Talmud as a particular ancient text that needs to be interpreted ... but with the
Talmud as a corpus of law, as part of a larger, ongoing [Jewish legal] tradition.
And as a jurist, his task, as he sees it, is analogous to that of the scientist: to
create an abstract, self-contained, coherent system that will illuminate and
order the multifarious and recalcitrant data that demand illumination and
ordering. In a word, the task of both [theorist of Jewish law] and scientist is to
create an ordered world that will satisfy their intellectual and aesthetic needs
for comprehension and coherence.
Id. at 173.
Kaplan concludes that:
Even if the scientific model is not the best model for understanding the nature
of [Jewish law], even if the [analogy of] scientist-world [to Jewish legal
theorists-Jewish law] is not free of serious problems, even if one argues that
the objectivity and autonomy of science are of a different order than the
objectivity and autonomy of [Jewish law],nevertheless, Rabbi Soloveitchik, in
focusing upon and fusing together these two different sides of [Jewish law],
objectivity and autonomy with creativity and freedom, has touched the very
heart of the [Jewish legal theorist's] complex, dialectical relationship with
[Jewish law]: strict obedience, nay subservience, to the objective inner logic of
[Jewish law], combined with a sense of unbound intellectual freedom and
profound creative power.
Id. at 192.
A more recent comparison between the Brisker method and the scientific method
identifies an analogue to Reb Chaim's innovations in "the scientific revolution of the
early seventeenth century." Lichtenstein, supra note 6, at 3. In both cases,
a shift was effected from the "why" to the "what," and from the final cause to
the efficient cause. No longer is it the task ... to ascertain why a certain

of Talmudic analysis, although "there are key contraindicating findings
that may mandate discarding a much-cherished theory[,]" at the same
time, "there are also peripheral minutiae for the sake of which a deeply
held conviction will not be abandoned, in the hope that the difficulty will
be resolved by someone, somewhere, subsequently."' 0 9 Ultimately, like
the scientific method, the Brisker method is concerned with the "what"
rather than the "why," 1 0 thus focusing on conceptual definition and
categorization, aiming to ascertain a systematic understanding of how
the law functions.
B. Law and Economics
In perhaps the most striking of the parallels to the Brisker method, law
and economics has faced a number of criticisms similar to those leveled
against Reb Chaim's approach, broadly premised on the claim that the
economic analysis of law proves inconsistent with the methods and
substance of the legal principles it is designed to analyze. Some
opposition to the innovative qualities of law and economics seems based
in a broader rejection of the possibility of formulating a theory that
adequately explains the nature of law."' On a more substantive level,
[principle in Jewish law] is as it is, any more than it is the role of the scientist
to determine why nature behaves as it does. Rather, in both cases, the goal of
the analysis of the concrete phenomenon at hand is to understand what it is and
how it works.
Id. at 3. Moreover,
as in the scientific world, the transition from "why" to "what" achieved
breakthrough results for talmudic learning; focusing upon the "what" enabled
the establishment of a disciplined method, subject to verification and criticism ....
With the introduction of the Brisker approach, practical implications...
become the standard by which opinions ...could be examined, for positions
were now held accountable for their [legal] manifestations in actual practice....
Id. at 4.
Cf LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 34 (stating that "[a]s a scientist may be inspired by
conflicting empirical evidence to suggest a novel theory that will take all the disparate
phenomena into account, so the [theorist of Jewish law] will expound a distinction that
will allow for harmonious coherence").
109. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 38-39.
110. See Lichtenstein, supra note 6, passim. Cf.LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 56
(writing that the conceptual approach "relates to the content of Torah, its 'what' and
juridic 'why,' but not to a spiritual and philosophic 'why"'); LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5,
at 194 (writing that Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik "sought, in the spirit of a much-cherished
analogy to modem science, to focus upon the 'what' rather than the 'why."').
111. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 99-100 (1977):
For two hundred years we have been in thrall to the eighteenth-century
hypothesis that there are in social behavior and in societal development,
patterns which recur in the same way that they appear to recur in the physical
universe.
...[Tihe hypothesis is itself in error. [Humans'] fate will forever elude the
attempts of [their] intellect to understand it. The accidental variables which
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others have found economic analysis of law incompatible with the
general absence of economic rhetoric and references in the legal materials
that law and economics purports to explain. 122 Finally, a related criticism
faults law and economics for its reliance on a core set of economic
principles, resulting in disregard for or insufficient attention to other
issues of complexity necessary for effective analysis of the law." 3
In evaluating these arguments, Posner acknowledges, to some degree,
the underlying concerns they identify, though he finds the criticisms4
ultimately based in "prevalent misconceptions" of law and economics."
Therefore, Posner's response to the critics focuses on "clarifying the
nature and aims of the economic approach." ' 1 5 Specifically, Posner depicts
law and economics as a vehicle for the scientific analysis of the law;
accordingly, its goals, methods, and properties parallel those of other
scientific theories.
Indeed, Posner ambitiously, expressly, and extensively described this
approach as the primary motivation behind the founding of the Journal
of Legal Studies:
The aim of the Journalis to encourage the application of scientific methods to
the study of the legal system. As biology is to living [systems], astronomy to
the stars, or economics to the price system so should legal studies be to the legal
system: an endeavor to make precise, objective, and systematic observations of

hedge us about effectively screen the future from our view. The quest for the
laws which will explain the riddle of human behavior leads us not toward truth
but toward the illusion of certainty, which is our curse. So far as we have been
able to learn, there are no recurrent patterns in the course of human events;
it is not possible to make scientific statements about history, sociology,
economics--or law.
Id. at 99-100 (quoted in Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1010 (1978)).
112. See Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U.
CHI. L. REv. 281, 292 (1979) (acknowledging "the prevalence of noneconomic rhetoric
in judicial decisions").
113. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy Is Dear At Any Price: A Response to Professor
Posner'sEconomic Theory, 12 GA. L. REv. 429 (1978):
The persuasiveness of Professor Posner's article on the economic theory of
privacy hinges on his apparent success in transforming, in classical rationalistic
fashion, a complex and disorderly jumble of legal rules into a simple and
unified scheme of explanation. Unfortunately, in at least one important sense,
Posner's theory is simplistic, not simple, because it accomplishes its objective
by avoiding, rather than confronting, complexity. He seduces by reduction,
rather than convincing by explanation.
Id. See also Leff, supra note 111, passim (characterizing law and economics as avoiding
complexity).
114. Posner, supra note 112, at 306.
115. POSNER, supra note 1, at 25.

how the legal system operate[d] in fact and to discover and explain the recurrent
patterns in the observations-the "laws" of the system. 116

Consistent with this approach, Posner has openly acknowledged that
"few judicial opinions contain explicit references to economic concepts."" 7
Likewise, he does not dispute the claim that "the assumptions of economic
theory are one-dimensional and pallid when viewed as descriptions of
human behavior--especially the behavior of such unconventional economic
'actors' as the judge, the litigant, the parent, the rapist, and others" in the
law." 18 In Posner's view, however, these observations, though descriptively
accurate, do not undermine the validity of the scientific nature of the
economic analysis of law. Instead, he insists, when presented as criticisms,
these claims "bring[] out the fundamental difference between the legal
and the economic culture or, more broadly, between the humanistic and
the scientific approach."' " 19 Specifically, he argues, resistance to law and
economics reflects either an orientation among legal scholars against
"finding a simple, theoretical structure" to uncover "an inner, and simple,
economic logic"' 2 in the law, 120 or a general "dimiss[al of] the whole of
social science."' '
In response, Posner explains that "[t]he goal of science, including
economic science, is to explain complex and seemingly unrelated
phenomena by reference to a theoretical model or construct, and the
power of a scientific explanation can be expressed as the ratio of the
different phenomena explained to the number of assumptions in the
theory."' 22 Moreover, "[a] simple theory tends to yield more, and more
definite, hypotheses than a complex one... ; if these hypotheses survive
their confrontation with the test data, the power of the theory to organize
diverse phenomena is confirmed." 23 Therefore, "[a]bstraction is... the
essence of scientific theory, and a successful theory is bound
' 24to ignore a
good deal of the apparent differences between phenomena.'
Drawing a substantive comparison to the natural sciences, Posner
notes that "Newton's law of falling bodies is unrealistic in its basic
assumption that bodies fall in a vacuum, but it is still a useful theory
because it predicts with reasonable accuracy the behavior of a wide
116.

Richard A. Posner, Volume One of the Journalof Legal Studies-An Afterword,

1 J.LEGAL STuD. 437, 437 (1972).
117. POSNER, supra note 1, at 25.
118. Id. at 17.
119. Posner, supra note 112, at 301. Cf James Boyde White, Economics and Law:
Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REv. 161 (1986).
120. Posner, supra note 112, at 302.
121. Id. at288.
122. Id. at 301.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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variety of falling bodies in the real world." 125 "Similarly," he suggests, "an
economic theory of law will not capture the full complexity, richness,
and confusion of the phenomena-criminal or judicial or marital or
whatever-it seeks to illuminate." 126 In fact, according to Posner, any
"lack of realism in the sense of descriptive completeness, far from
invalidating the theory, is a precondition of theory. A theory that sought
faithfully to reproduce the complexity of the empirical world in 12its
7
assumptions would not be a theory-an explanation-but a description.'
Finally, Posner likewise argues that the "prevalence of noneconomic
rhetoric in judicial decisions' ' 2 8 does not undermine the theoretical
validity and value of law and economics. He points out that "the major
economizing doctrines of the common law preceded the development of
an explicit economic theory of law that might have made the specialized
rhetoric of economics available for use in judicial decisions."12 9 After
all, he continues, "[j]ust as people were maximizing utility before the
terms were invented by economists, judges may have been maximizing
efficiency before the language of economics gained currency in judicial
opinions."' 3 ° In addition, he argues, "often the true grounds of legal
decisions are concealed rather than illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric
of opinions," and he posits that "legal education consists primarily of
learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface to find those31 grounds,
many of which may turn out to have an economic character."'
POSNER, supra note 1, at 17.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Posner, supra note 112, at 292.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. POSNER, supra note 1, at 25.
To some degree, less technical characterizations of law and economics likewise find
echoes in descriptions of the Brisker method. For example, Arthur Leff draws an intriguing,
albeit unfavorably intended, analogy between the picaresque novel, such as Tom Jones,
Huckleberry Finn, or Don Quixote, and Posner's text on economic analysis of law. In
the novel,
the eponymous hero sets out into a world of complexity and brings to bear on
successive segments of it the power of his own particular personal vision. The
world presents itself as a series of problems; to each problem that vision acts as
a form of solution; and the problem having been dispatched, our hero passes on
to the next adventure.
Leff, supra note 111, at 451. Similarly, Leff asserts, "Posner's hero is eponymous[]" in
the character of "Economic Analysis," who "ride[s] out into the world of law,
encountering one after another almost all of the ambiguous villains of legal thought ....
In each case Economic [Analysis] ...brings to bear his single-minded self, and the Evil

125.

V. CONCLUSION

As Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein has noted, together with "the triumphal
ascendancy of the conceptual approach," the Brisker method has,
inevitably, undergone changes. 13 2 In part as a result of its successful
emergence as the dominant and established approach of Talmudic analysis,
"[t]he spirit of independence that guided [Reb Chaim's] bold originality
has gradually become more muted." 133 Likewise, the widespread
influence of Reb Chaim's ideas has been coupled with the parallel
of a wider variety of methods that share the conceptual
development
134
approach.

As for the future, despite expressing a "reluctan[ce] to predict," Rabbi
Lichtenstein offers "some qualified remarks."'' 35 Specifically, he anticipates
the continuation of recent trends, such as a modification of the Brisker
method into "more blended models," including "greater awareness of
Ones ... dissolve, one after another." Id. at 452. As Leff acknowledges, "[t]o hold the
mind-set constant while the world is played in manageable chunks before its searching
Id.
single light is a powerful analytic idea ....
More positively, Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik has used somewhat analogous imagery to
describe the Brisker method:
[A] person... awakes in the middle of the night and cannot figure out just
where he is .... The whole picture of his room and its furniture is distorted
and unreal. Suddenly he finds the lamp switch, flicks it on and a clear light
shines on his surroundings. Everything is in order and he recovers his sense of
place, his orientation. He can't understand himself, why wasn't he able to
picture his room and its furniture, why did he have such a confused image?
Wasn't everything so simple and clear?
Soloveitchik, Mah Dodech Midod, supra note 108, at 231 (quoted and translated in
Kaplan, supra note 102, at 164-65).
In a similar vein, it is said that Reb Chaim's father, an eminent scholar of Jewish law,
contrasted his own, more traditional approach, which resolved legal questions by
acknowledging the difficulty posed by the question and providing appropriate answers,
with his son's innovative methodology, which responded to legal questions by
demonstrating that the question did not really pose any difficulty because it was
premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal system. See SCHACHTER,
supra note 106, at 18-19 n.23.
In yet another description that evokes Leffts imagery, Rabbi Soloveitchik writes
dramatically of his childhood perceptions of the heroic manner in which his father,
teaching an advanced class in Jewish law, employed the Brisker method to "defend"
Rambam against the "attacks" of intellectual opponents and "enemies." RABBI JOSEPH B.
SOLOVEITCHIK, U'BIKASHTEM MI-SHAM, in ISH HA-HALAKHAH: GALUI v'NISTAR 230-31

(1979).
132. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 53-54.
133. Id. at 54.
134. See id. at 54-55.
135. Rabbi Lichtenstein specifies that he offers these thoughts, in response to a
request, for the benefit of "educational planning." LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 55.
He also emphasizes that he is conscious of the possibility that "the wish, to some extent,
may be father to some thoughts," though he adds that he "trust[s] that [his] own admitted
inclinations will not distort [his] perceptions." Id.

[VOL. 8: 95, 2006]

Richard PosnerMeets Reb Chaim of Brisk
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

factual points[,] recourse to a wider arc of sources[,] ... and thematic
expansion," perhaps incorporating a consideration of "a spiritual and
philosophic 'why."", 136 Moreover, he suggests, as a result of the Brisker
method's becoming "conventional, and in some cases even clich6-ridden,
the danger of lapsing into. . . 'stock responses' looms large; and these
factors may erode the preeminence of the approach."' 137 Nevertheless,
Rabbi Lichtenstein concludes that "[t]here may be complements, but for
the time being, no substitute" for the conceptual
approach as "the
138
optimal mode of' the study of Jewish law.
Any effort to evaluate the present and future state of law and economics
may seem even more perilous than similar attempts directed toward the
Brisker method; nevertheless, a brief discussion may prove valuable, if
only as an illustration of yet one more apparent parallel that spans the
two methods. In the 2003 edition of his text, Posner boldly declares that,
defying repeated predictions of its demise or reduced significance, 3 9 the
economic analysis of law "has now outlasted legal realism, legal
process, and every other one of the twentieth century's new fields of
legal scholarship, except those too recent to have yet reached their peak.
And it shows no signs of abating.' 40

136.

Id. at 56.

LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 56. Indeed, an additional criticism of the
Brisker method finds fault with the seemingly universal application of dichotomous
analysis to resolve nearly every legal problem, even when such an approach appears
overly formalistic or even, arguably, somewhat illogical. See Lichtenstein, supra note 6,
at 6-9 & n. 17; See Lichtenstein, supra note 6, at n. 11 (stating that "[t]he more popular
and widespread the conceptual approach became, the greater such a danger became").
Similar criticisms have been leveled against law and economics since as early as the
appearance of the first edition of Posner's text. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 111, at 452
(writing of Posner's "tunnel vision" and the "limitations" that "arise from the singleapproach strategy itself' as well as "from the particular mode of apprehension chosen
[by Posner] to be single-minded with"); see Leff, supra note 111, passim.
137.

138.

LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 57.

139. See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics
Movement: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 231 (1991); Owen M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 245

(1989); Horwitz, supra note 86, at 912; Leonard R. Jaffee, The Troubles with Law and
Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 777, 779 (1992).
140. POSNER, supra note 1, at 28. See also POSNER, supra note 1, at xx n.3
(referring to "the continued growth of economic analysis of law") (citing William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A QuantitativeStudy,
36 J. L. & ECON. 385 (1993)); POSNER, supra note 1, at xx n.3 (noting "[tihe number of
changes (especially additions) in this sixth edition [that] attest to the growth in the
scholarly literature in just the last five years"). See also MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra

To be sure, over the years since the appearance of the first edition of
Posner's text, in addition to the evolution of Posner's approach, the field
of law and economics has undergone changes, modification, and a
diversification of goals and methodologies,141 leading some to question
its continued vitality as a unified movement. 142 Indeed, looking to the
future, Posner entertains the possibility that, "[l]ike some of the other
fields, [law and economics] may some day become so woven into the
143
fabric of the law that it ceases to be visible as a distinct field.,
Ultimately, however, similar to Rabbi Lichtenstein's assessment of the

Brisker method, Posner confidently concludes that "for now, [the economic
analysis of law] is well worth studying as a fruitful,
interesting, and
144
influential body of insight and analytic techniques."

note 9, at 172 (stating that "[t]here are a great many factors which suggest that any
predictions of the demise of Law and Economics are extremely premature").
141. See, e.g., Symposium on Post-ChicagoLaw and Economics, 65 CHi.-KENT L.
Rnv. 3 (1989); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors: A Critique of ClassicalLaw and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989);
Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
537 (1998); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998); Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted
Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral
Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1141 (2001); Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal
Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002
U. ILL. L. REv. 875. See generally Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and
Economics?, 64 MD. L. REv. 303 (2005); MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 8, passim.
142.

See Bernstein, supra note 141, at 322.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 28. Cf MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 9, at 172
(arguing that "[i]f Law and Economics seems less threatening now, it may be due to the
fact that a number of its basic insights have become more or less a part of orthodox legal
thinking" and that Law and Economics "is now an entrenched part of the legal landscape").
144. POSNER, supra note 1, at 28.
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